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The oil and gas sector has traditionally played a highly important role not only in the Russian mineral 
complex, but also in the domestic economy. Currently, the hydrocarbon sector accounts for 60 % of 
Russian export revenues and contributes over 45 % to the federal budget. As a result, this sector has 
been a driving force behind the economic development of the entire country and especially the oil and 
gas producing regions.
The evolution of the Russian resource management system reveals a complex picture in terms of already 
adopted decisions and future strategies in relation to resource development and revenue utilisation. 
During the 1992–2009 period, Russia failed to create an effective model of hydrocarbon resource 
management – both in terms of exploration and development of oil and gas resources, and in terms of 
adequate use of oil and gas revenues for the diversification of the national economy.
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Introduction
The oil and gas sector has traditionally 
played a highly important role not only in 
the Russian mineral complex, but also in the 
domestic economy. Currently, the hydrocarbon 
sector accounts for 60 % of Russian export 
revenues and contributes over 45 % to the 
federal budget. As a result, this sector has been a 
driving force behind the economic development 
of the entire country and especially the oil and 
gas producing regions.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991, Russian policies and legislative efforts in 
relation to natural resource management have 
been at the cornerstone of domestic political and 
economic processes. Unfortunately, the Russian 
government has been unable to promote a system 
of adequate mechanisms for motivating oil and 
gas companies to develop hydrocarbon resources 
in a socially effective way. This is result not only 
of complexity to create modern hydrocarbon 
resource management system, but rather result 
of clash of diverse interests of within the federal 
centre, regions, oil and gas companies and their 
owners. 
This article seeks to examine decision-
making processes and procedures in relation to 
the natural resource management and the use 
of hydrocarbon revenues in Russia in the 1990s 
and the 2000s. Since Russia is a federal state, 
relations between the federal government and the 
resource-rich regions have played the main role 
in shaping a system of resource management, 
licensing and taxation. 
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In this respect, Russia has gone through two 
stages of development:
• 1992 – 2001 – formation of a decentralised 
model, based on the active participation 
of the resource-rich regions and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), 
representing diverse interest groups; 
emergence of new private corporate 
entities;
• 2002 – present – transition to a highly 
centralised bureaucratic model of resource 
management in the oil and gas sector 
dominated by the federal government; 
partial restoration of the state property 
in the oil and gas sector ownership as a 
form of additional securing of the state 
priorities (as in political as in fiscal 
spheres – including state-related business 
groups).
The first period was characterised by the 
substantial control of hydrocarbon rents by 
certain individuals, as well as newly formed 
independent financial-industrial groups. The 
subsequent period has been characterised by 
the strong will of government (primarily at the 
federal level) to establish a basis for the modern 
system of resource management and publicly 
and economically efficient use of hydrocarbon 
revenues. 
In the 1990s, the main government agenda 
was to implement policy reforms vital for the 
establishment of a new resource management 
system in Russia. In the government’s opinion, 
the main task of the new system was to ensure the 
accumulation of a bulk of resource rents in the 
state budget (as at the federal as at the regional 
level). The World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund also proposed similar policies 
to the Russian government. The essence of these 
proposals were to consolidate the largest part of 
oil and gas revenues in the state budget, which 
could then be used to promote social stability 
and to support uncompetitive sectors of the 
national economy. The idea was through heavy 
taxation of the oil-and-gas sector to give a chance 
to uncompetitive sectors to use state money 
to overcome the transition period to market 
economy, while the oil-and-gas sector could be 
financed through loans provided by the above-
mentioned international financial institutions (as 
well as the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development). 
Since 2002 the federal centre started to 
implement a policy of strengthening its role in the 
accumulation of hydrocarbon revenues, including 
the enlargement of its direct presence in the oil 
and gas sector. Simultaneously though, further 
development of a resource management system 
intended to ensure economic and long term 
efficiency has been curtailed.
Overall, this period saw a notable attempt by 
the government to promote a highly centralised 
system of planning, adoption and implementation 
of decisions regarding the natural resource 
sector. As part of this process, the federal 
centre effectively curtailed the excesses of the 
previous period, associated with the decisive role 
of regional authorities and financial-industrial 
groups in Russia’s political and economic system.1 
However, though the current system has managed 
to correct the excesses of the 1990s, it has failed 
to form a modern and effective model of resource 
management.
1. Evolution of natural resource  
management in Russia
1.1. Decision-making processes  
in the development of natural resources
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991, oil, gas, diamonds, precious metals, nickel, 
1 Kryukov V., Tokarev A. Oil-and-gas resources in a tran-
sitional economy: comparing realized and potential so-
cial value of mineral wealth (theory, practice, analysis, 
and estimates). – Novosibirsk: Science-Centre, 2007. – 
588 p.
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and aluminium have been the main commodities 
generating considerable economic rents during 
the transitive period of the Russian economy. 
In the 1990s, oil was contested by the federal 
centre and the regions as the main commodity 
generating considerable rents under volatile 
economic conditions, thus ensuring a certain 
degree of social stability and the political survival 
of the ruling elites. 
The division of authority rights over the 
mineral resources in Russia has been one of the 
main outcomes of the centre-periphery bargaining 
game of the early 1990s. For example, in 1990–
1991 the Parliaments of Russia’s ethnic republics 
(including oil-rich Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, 
Komi and Udmurtia) adopted Declarations 
on State Sovereignty, proclaiming their sole 
jurisdiction over local natural resources. The 
Federation Treaty of 31 March 1992 also declared 
all natural resources the property of local 
populations. Although the Russian Constitution 
of December 1993 abolished this principle, four 
ethnic republics (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, 
Udmurtia and Yakutia) continued to assert their 
‘sovereign’ authority over local natural resources. 
In response, the federal legislation on natural 
resources vaguely defined federal and regional 
authority over resources in this field in order to 
pacify the separatist regions. Thus, divergent 
views on the role and place of the federal centre 
and the regions in the resource management 
system found their way into the legislation.
On one hand, the legislation established 
the principle of joint jurisdiction over natural 
resources (the “two-keys” system) while on the 
other hand it envisaged the division of ownership 
rights over natural resources in accordance with 
the administrative-territorial state hierarchy. The 
main legal act on the subject, the 1992 federal 
law “On Subsoil”, introduced the concept of 
the division of all natural resources into three 
categories: federal, regional and municipal. 
The result of this “spontaneous” 
arrangement regarding rights over subsoil use 
(which concerned not only oil and gas, but also 
other mineral resources, such as diamonds, gold 
and iron ore) was the reinforcement of the joint 
jurisdiction principle by the legislation. This 
principle asserted the existence of equal rights for 
both the federal government and a given region in 
their dealings with subsoil issues. It is important 
to note that this principle ensured that a given 
resource-rich region would receive a portion of 
resource rents.1 
Therefore, the law “On subsoil” served as 
the foundation for legislative principles regarding 
resource management. This normative legal base 
was founded on the principles of:
• fee-based subsoil use;
• equal access to fields for all overseeing 
subjects;
• licensed rights to the subsoil use;
• transparent distribution of rents. 
Particularly important is that until 
2001 the law “On subsoil” defined 
not only the methods of collection of 
rent income, but also the proportion of 
their distribution between the federal 
government and the resource-rich 
regions (where the mineral resources 
were produced).The federal government 
received 40 % and the regions 60 %, 
of which half was set aside for the 
municipal government and half for the 
regional budget;
• joint jurisdiction between the federal 
government and a given resource-rich 
region.
1 Kryukov V., Seliverstov V., Tokarev A. Federalism and 
Regional Policy in Russia: Problems of Socio-Economic 
Development of Resource Territories and Subsoil Use in 
The Dynamics "Real Federalism": Law, Economic De-
velopment, and Indigenous Communities in Russia and 
Canada / Ed. by P.H. Solomon. Toronto: Centre for Rus-
sian and East European Studies, Univ. of Toronto, 2004, 
p. 96–127.
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In the 1990s, in addition to the formation 
of the new resource management system, the 
Russian oil and gas sector experienced major 
institutional changes with the formation of a 
completely new institutional environment in the 
oil and gas sector. During this period, assets of 
old state enterprises, responsible for exploration, 
production, refining and distribution of refined 
products were consolidated under an umbrella 
of newly established vertically-integrated 
companies. The new oil conglomerates made sure 
to secure under their control the key industrial 
assets essential for incorporating the entire 
technologically-linked chain of oil production, 
refining and petroleum product sales. Several 
companies were established on this principle, 
including private corporate entities, such as 
Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, and Yukos as well as 
the state oil company, Rosneft, which managed 
a large share of the state’s oil industrial assets. 
At the same time, the assets of the state pipeline 
system were transferred under the control of the 
state company, Transneft, whereas the assets of 
the Ministry of Gas Industry were incorporated 
under the umbrella of the newly-established 
state gas concern, Gazprom. Apart from these 
vertically-integrated companies, several other 
(partially integrated) regional companies were 
established, such as Tatneft, Bashneft, and 
KomiTEK. The formation of these regional oil 
companies without federal involvement was 
possible due to the political weakness of the 
federal centre at this time, as well as the growing 
strength of regional elites in some key resource-
rich Russian provinces, such as Bashkortostan, 
Tatarstan, Udmurtia, and Komi Republic.
The economic and financial potential of 
the large vertically-integrated oil companies 
were considerably higher than that of many 
regions, making them also highly influential 
at the federal level. At the same time, partially 
integrated regional oil companies were fully 
controlled by regional administrations and 
local governors.
As soon as all regional heads began to 
be elected by popular vote, federal companies 
began to experience the full scale control 
of provincial authorities over new oil fields 
which the companies sought to develop and 
of the existent oil resources which they had 
initially received. The regions flexed the power 
afforded to them under the “two-keys” system 
to extract concessions from the oil companies 
operating in their territories in the form of 
various social, financial, constructional and 
environmental projects. The oil giants provided 
credit to local agricultural and industrial 
producers, established grants to educational 
organisations, built roads, hospitals and 
houses, and sold petroleum products to local 
consumers at discounted prices. In other words, 
regional elites used the “two-keys” system to 
extract resources from federal oil companies 
to maintain local socio-economic stability and 
thus voter satisfaction. 
Since the federal government was not directly 
involved in the management of Russia’s natural 
resources in the 1990s, resource-rich regions 
became the driving force behind the development 
of a joint jurisdiction system. In this respect, 
the legislative and executive bodies in these 
regions adopted relevant laws and administrative 
procedures, and also set up relevant regional 
executive power bodies to envisage the subsoil 
use.
Legislators in some resource-rich territories 
sought to transform the fundamental principles of 
natural resource use. A few pre-existent norms 
and procedures were abolished, namely the free-
of-charge access to resources, the anonymity of 
the owner, and the lack of control systems and 
effective administration in the regions’ efforts 
to promote efficient use of natural resources. For 
example, in the Tyumen region, legislators and 
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the majority of oil and gas companies facilitated 
intensive discussions on the following issues:1
• the use of regional authority over allocation 
and control procedures in the oil and gas 
sector to ensure stable revenues to local 
and regional budgets;
• implementation of strict environmental 
regulations for areas of oil and gas 
production;
• establishment of legal limits on the 
development and expansion of oil and gas 
operations in regions where traditional 
forms of economic management were 
practiced by indigenous peoples of the 
North;2
• participation in the decision-making 
processes involving the examination and 
implementation of development plans for 
new oil and gas fields.
A lack of detailed procedures on conflict 
resolution between the centre and the regions 
over resource management issues and the 
absence of a civil system of social norms and 
legal procedures in general led to the inefficiency 
of the joint jurisdiction system in Russia in 
the 1990s. In 2001, the federal government 
introduced new administrative reforms aimed 
at the “harmonisation” of regional and federal 
laws, and the centralisation of decision-making 
regarding resource management. 
However, the highly centralised system of 
resource management introduced after 2001, rather 
than tackling the deficiencies and excesses of the 
previous period, led to an over-bureaucratisation 
of the decision-making processes and of the 
coordination efforts between administrative 
institutions. As a result, the resource-rich regions 
1 Kryukov V., Shafranik Yu. Zapadno-Sibirskii phe-
nomen. Tyumen na styke vekov: mezhdu legendarnym 
proshlym i neyasnym budushim? [Western Siberian oil 
in 1990s]. – M.: Polteks. 2000, 240 p.
2 Kryukov V., Tokarev A. Indigenous peoples and oil: 
Russian case study. – M.: Tsentr sodeistviia korennykh 
narodov Severa, 2005, 172 p.
became sidelined from active participation in 
mineral resource management, and are currently 
being excluded from the distribution of rents from 
the extraction of hydrocarbon resources. If in the 
1990s the share of rents reached approximately 
50–60 % of the budget of Khanty-Mansiysk 
autonomous okrug (KMAO, the largest oil 
producer in Russia), by 2008 this share decreased 
to 2–3 % and by 2010 to zero level.
The abolition of the “two-keys” principle 
within the subsoil legislation, which is still in 
Russian Constitution, resulted in a significant 
reduction of opportunities for the regions, and 
therefore the population, to participate in the 
creation of policy regarding the use of natural 
resources and, thus, the way of the socio-
economic development of their territories.
Since 2004, the Russian legislation has 
completely altered the regulatory authority of the 
centre and the regions in relation to subsoil use. 
A more democratic and transparent system of 
resources management of the 1990s was replaced 
by a highly centralised and bureaucratic system. In 
this respect, the regional authority became limited 
only to fields of local significance (as opposed to 
those of federal or strategic significance) which 
contain commonly occurring minerals. At the 
same time, regions began to play a “static” role in 
implementing the federal guidelines for subsoil 
use. The federal administrative powers increased 
substantially while the role of the regions, 
along with the municipalities and NGOs, were 
limited to the work of commissions charged with 
supervising whether the guidelines for subsoil 
use were adhered to. At the moment, these 
commissions do not have clear legislative status or 
authority. A given region’s authority over resource 
management depends on the bargaining power of 
its governor vis-à-vis the federal centre.
A further step in the bureaucratisation of 
decision-making with regard to subsoil usage 
was taken in April 2008, when the definition 
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of “strategic” resources was introduced into 
the Russian legislation. The exploration and 
extraction of natural resources from federal fields 
have gained strategic importance in the protection 
of the country and the government. The fields 
bearing federal significance include fields that:
• contain natural resources in excess of 
70 million tonnes of oil; in excess of 50 
billion cubic metres of gas; in excess of 
50 tonnes of vein gold; in excess of 500 
thousand tons of copper;
• are located in the inland sea water, 
territorial seawater, and the continental 
shelf of the Russian Federation.
Fields that fit the following categories are 
transferred to state companies (or companies 
with governmental stakes) on a sole source basis. 
As a result of these measures introduced in 2008, 
the principle of bureaucratic administration, in 
dealing with issues of resource management, 
became dominant.
1.2. Licensing policy  
in oil and gas sector
Licensing policy is an important aspect of 
resource management. Licensing policy can 
significantly reduce monopolistic tendencies with 
regard to mineral resources, and can also create 
conditions for the optimisation of expenditures 
and the development of an effective institutional 
structure.1
The difficult financial conditions of the 1990s 
led regional authorities to hold as many natural 
resource auctions and tenders as possible. When 
dealing with resources under joint jurisdiction, 
regions resorted to applying their exclusive 
ownership rights over local natural resources or 
employed the “two-keys” principle. The main 
1 Kryukov V., Sevastyanova A., Tokarev A., Shmat V. 
Evolutional approach to formation of oil and gas re-
source management system. – Novosibirsk: Institute of 
Economics. 2002, 168 p.
intention behind sales of licences (access rights) 
was not necessarily to provide solutions to the 
vast spectrum of socio-economic issues of the 
time, but rather to receive one-time payments 
(bonuses). In order to garner larger bonuses, 
regions auctioned off their best possessions, such 
as the Priobsk oil field (KMAO), the Yurobcheno-
Takhomsk oil field (Evenkiisky autonomous 
okrug), the Talakan oil field (Yakutia), and the 
Kovyktinsk gas field (Irkutsk region). As a result 
of such practices, the regions lessened their 
opportunities to address future socio-economic 
issues within an improved resource management 
system, which could have come about from the 
use of access rights as strategic levers.2
Despite the large number of successfully 
completed resources licensing auctions and 
tenders, many licenses were not used by the 
companies which had won them. The number 
of unused licenses, or licenses with multiple 
violations, attests to the underdeveloped 
conditions which were present within the 
administrative institutions at differing levels 
of power. For example the fundamental by-
law, “Resolution on licensing procedures” 
(1992), did not establish supervisory powers 
for Russian regions, implying that the norms 
set out in the federal law “On subsoil” were 
not developed. Regions did not have clear 
legislative authority over early termination, 
suspension or limitation of subsoil licences: 
the licensing procedures resolution states 
that subsoil licences can be terminated early, 
suspended and limited only by the Russian 
Ministry of Natural Resources or its respected 
regional branches. Therefore, the procedures 
for regional participation in this process were 
not clearly defined.
2 Kryukov V. Instituttsional’naya struktura neftegazovo-
go sektora: problemy i napravleniya transformatsii [In-
stitutional structure of oil and gas sector: problems and 
transformations]. – Novosibirsk: Institute of Economics. 
1998, 280 p.
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Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, 
the federal centre and the regions held many 
resource licensing auctions in order to secure 
auction bonuses and subsequent tax payments 
to their respective budgets, which were vital 
for ensuring socio-economic stability. While 
regional administrations were more interested in 
using these budgetary funds for solving pressing 
socio-economic problems, the federal centre 
was solely interested in securing tax payments 
from oil and gas production. Regions began to 
promote company-region licensing agreements, 
which contained additional company obligations 
in relation to urgent socio-economic projects of 
the region, soon after the regional rents share 
decreased in favour of the federal centre. 
During the 2000s, the strengthening role 
of the state became the main impetus behind 
the changes to the Russian oil and gas sector’s 
regulatory regime. As power became more 
concentrated at the federal level, improving 
the “manageability” of subsoil usage became 
a governmental priority. The government 
hence obtained practically all rents from the oil 
and gas companies and gained direct control 
over key industry assets (such as Gazprom 
and Rosneft) in what can be considered the 
government’s hard answer to the soft oil and gas 
sector business practices of the 1990s. Having 
thus restored relative control over the sector, 
the government’s most important task at hand 
now became the fine-tuning of the resource 
management system, including the mobilisation 
of investment into new projects and districts, 
along with strengthening monitoring and 
oversight over field development.
Overall, the unfavourable conditions 
surrounding the licensing policy can be attributed 
to the following components:
• the fiscal orientation of the national 
economic policy concerning the oil and 
gas sector;
• the ambiguity and contradictions of 
the principle of joint jurisdicton in 
practice;
• competition among different governmental 
institutions;
• underdeveloped and unclear regulatory 
measures concerning the role of licensing 
agreements in subsoil use; this results in 
a weak legal basis for claims against oil 
companies;
• lack of recourse regulations, including the 
termination of licenses due to violation of 
the agreement. 
The main consequences of an ineffective 
licensing system for the use of hydrocarbon fields 
in Russia are:
• a significant number of unused licenses 
(or licenses that are being violated);
• lack of opportunity for efficient utilisation 
of extracted hydrocarbon materials, as in 
the case of associated gas;
• lack of a stable and functioning financing 
system for general geological surveys of 
the territories. 
1.3. The changing nature  
of mineral resource management  
in Russia
The increased role of the federal government 
through centralisation has definitively shaped 
Russian legislation on subsoil. Table 1 presents 
the most important changes made to the principal 
subsoil-use legislation in Russia, and the state 
policy in the oil-and-gas sector.
As a result of the changes made to 
hydrocarbon regulations over time, the following 
significant developments took place in Russia as 
of 2001:
• A shift of the government’s “negotiating 
powers” vis-à-vis parties involved 
within the oil and gas sector, resulting 
in a strengthened role of the federal 
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centre through administrative reforms 
and a consolidation of the “power 
vertical”;
• Revenues from the oil and gas sector 
became the “nuclei” of the country’s 
entire financial system as a result of the 
rising oil prices and subsequent increase 
in the volume of rents. This, in turn, 
had a direct impact on the norms and 
regulations associated with rental tax 
collection and distribution.
2. How effective is the tax policy? 
The basic characteristics of oil and gas 
taxation system include: flexibility of norms and 
regulations; tax optimisation opportunities for 
companies, and an inclusive role for oil and gas 
producing regions in implementing tax policies. 
On the basis of these characteristics, one could 
divide the evolution of Russia’s taxation system 
into the following stages.
Stage I. Formation of a fee-based system for 
subsoil usage (1992–2001):
• 1992–1995 – Creation of a new taxation 
system, based on the Russian law “On 
subsoil”; this period of political and 
economic transition was characterised 
by the widespread use of non-market 
mechanisms for the collection and 
distribution of rents, including price 
control measures;
• 1995–1999 – Resource-producing 
regions implement active tax 
policies combined with limited use 
of differentiated (flexible) taxation. 
Low oil prices in external markets 
are partially responsible for active 
application of transfer pricing policies 
by oil and gas producers as well as 
tax optimisation strategies aimed at 
maintaining minimum profitability in 
times of volatile economic conditions;
Table 1. Legislation on subsoil usage and government policy
Issues regarding subsoil use First versions of the law  on subsoil (since 1992)
Current legislation and policy  
on subsoil use passed after 2001
Subsoil ownership State (federal-regional) ownership State (federal) ownership
Oil and gas resource management Joint jurisdiction between the 
Federation and the regions
Federal control
The role of oil- and gas-rich 
regions in the licensing
“Two-keys” principle Regional approval with the federal 
centre adopting the main decision 
Distribution of rents* Regulated by the law on subsoil 
use
Regulated by the tax and budget 
legislation 
Regional share of hydrocarbon 
rental incomes
60 % of the royalty 0–5 % of the oil production tax, 
0 % – of the gas production tax 
Monitoring and oversight of 
subsoil development 
Weak federal control Conditions implemented for the 
strengthening of the federal role
The role of local authorities in 
subsoil management
Weak role Practically absent
Recourse/Turnover for the subsoil 
use rights
No provision No formal provision, but exists in 
practice
Access rights for subsoil use Licensing through auctions and 
tenders
Licensing through auctions and 
tenders
Access to subsoil Equal access principle Limited access to subsoil for 
foreign companies
* In this case, rents imply royalty and/or production tax, excluding export duties and excise taxes
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• 2000–2001 – Widespread use of tax 
optimisation strategies by oil and gas 
producers; a gradual withdrawal of 
governmental policies on differentiated 
taxation also takes place.
Stage II. Development of a new taxation 
system:
• 2002–2006 – The role of regions in 
resource management is weakened; 
introduction of the mineral production 
tax becomes an effective solution to the 
problem of transfer pricing; absence of 
flexible approaches towards the collection 
of rental incomes;
• 2007 – present – Increased use of flexible 
taxation in oil production; a monitoring 
and oversight system for subsoil use is 
gradually developing. 
As result distribution of oil rents in Russia 
changed drastically (See Fig. 1).
Improvement of the taxation system is a 
vital component of effective oil and gas resource 
management, along with an efficient regulation 
of hydrocarbon development and production, 
licensing system, and access to transport 
infrastructures. Such improvements are best 
made in stages and in sync with the reform of 
other elements of the resource management 
system.
2.1. Tax policy in the oil  
and gas sector from 1992 to 2001 
The taxation of oil and gas production 
has great significance for the Russian federal 
budget, as well as the budgets of oil and gas 
producing regions. The foundations for a new 
system of taxation in the oil and gas sector were 
established in 1992 when special taxes, designed 
to accumulate rents for the state budget, were 
introduced alongside regular taxes. The main 
mechanisms for the acquisition of rents from 
1992 to 2001 involved the mineral resource 
reproduction tax (MRRT), oil and gas excise 
taxes, royalties, and export duties.
The MRRT comprised up to 10 % of 
marketable oil and gas production, and was 
absorbed by the federal and regional budgets. 
From 1992 to 2001, the primary purpose of the 
MRRT was to finance and support geological 
explorations, and was justified as a measure of 
transitional economics. However, a significant 
portion of the MRRT was diverted to other areas 
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Fig. 1. Distribution of oil rents in Russia
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which had no direct relation to the oil and gas 
exploration. 
From 1992 to 2001, the excise duties on oil 
served as one of the mechanisms for the acquisition 
of rents. This tax was forwarded to the federal 
budget in its entirety. From the perspective of oil 
and gas producing regions, excise duties helped 
shape the main regional tax bases. The increase 
in excise duty rates led to a reduction in the 
tax base, calculated on the basis of marketable 
production, including the redistribution of tax 
payments between the federal budget and the oil 
and gas producing regions.
A significant part of oil and gas taxes, which 
went to the government prior to 2002, came from 
royalty. The share of royalties comprised 6 % to 
16 % of gross revenue / the value of marketable 
production (oil and gas). The average royalty rate 
was 8 % for oil and 14 % for gas. The dependency 
of royalties on the market price of hydrocarbons 
resulted in considerable state transactional costs 
during the time of economic transformation, due 
to oil and gas companies’ practice of transfer 
pricing.1
An important feature of royalty was its 
distribution between the different levels of the 
state hierarchy. The federal government received 
40 % and the regions 60 %, of which half was set 
aside for the municipal government and half for 
the regional budget. As the greater part of royalty 
payments was sent to the regional budgets during 
the 1992–2001 period, the federal government 
did not initially address the problem of transfer 
pricing in the oil and gas sector.
From 1995 to 2001, oil and gas producing 
regions placed additional conditions for the 
exemption of certain categories of fields from 
royalty. Exemptions from royalty gained greater 
1 Tokarev A. Nalogovoe regulirovaniie neftegazovogo 
sektora: regional’nye aspekty [Tax policy in oil sector: 
regional aspects]. – Novosibirsk: Institute of Economics. 
2000. – 256 p.
emphasis during the later stages of development 
of both fields and the oil and gas producing 
provinces. 
Hydrocarbon taxation policy has shown that 
in order to build a rental-oriented taxation system 
which, from the government’s point of view, is 
effective, it is necessary to have a number of pre-
existing conditions such as:
• transparency of the hydrocarbon sector or 
government involvement (both regional 
and federal) within oil and gas company 
ownership;
• existence of a competitive environment at 
the regional level;
• development of a resource management 
system and also the presence of adequate 
monitoring and field development 
supervision systems;
• presence of a meaningful tax policy at the 
regional level.
During the 1990s, large-scale transformations 
occurred within the oil and gas sector in Russia. 
Vertically-integrated oil companies responsible 
for the entire production process (from geological 
exploration and extraction to marketing of 
processed products for consumers), were 
established during this time. Such companies 
had great influence on the effectiveness of the 
acquisition mechanisms for mineral rent.
The volume of payable hydrocarbon taxes 
(special and general taxes for all economic 
sectors) is mainly determined by the market price 
of oil and gas. Oil prices, used to determine the 
tax base, develop primarily within the framework 
of vertically-integrated oil companies. In order to 
lower tax payments (especially royalties and the 
MRRT prior to 2001), companies broadly applied 
lowered transfer prices. Another important aspect 
of transfer pricing is that it allows the transfer 
of the tax base from producing regions to other 
regions and to optimise the general level of the 
tax burden.
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From 1998 to 2000, inter-corporate pricing 
had a real negative effect on KMAO’s budget – 
a territory that accounts for more than 55 % of 
Russian oil production. According to the Russian 
Accounts Chamber, the tax burden across 
different enterprises varied by a factor of 2 or 3. 
As a result of the use of transfer pricing by oil 
companies, the KMAO budget sustained losses 
of $0.2 billion and $0.96 billion in 1999 and 2000 
respectively.
Russian Institute for Financial Studies 
estimates reveal the scale of tax optimisation in the 
oil sector.1 In 2000, one of the most “successful” 
years in terms of tax optimisation in hydrocarbon 
sector, tax evasion resulted in the loss of $4.9 
billion. Throughout the period of 2000–2002, 
the consolidated Russian budget lost $3–5 billion 
annually (depending on price levels and volumes 
of production).2 Experts estimate that, at the same 
time, rents in the oil sector comprised around 
$25–30 billion in 2000–2001.
The abovementioned weaknesses of the tax 
policy necessitated various modifications. This 
resulted in the development of a new system 
of taxation for the oil and gas sector starting in 
2002.
2.2. Development  
of the special tax system in 2000s
Significant changes occurred in the oil and 
gas taxation system when a production tax on 
mineral resources was introduced in 2002. The 
MRRT, excise duties and royalties were replaced 
with the production tax. A specific tax base rate 
(roubles per tonne) was introduced. The base rate 
1 Vygon G. Otsenka nalogovoi nagruzki na rossiiskie 
neftyanye kompanii v 2000 godu. – Moscow: Institute 
for Financial Studies. 2002, 29 p.
2 Tokarev A. Analyz struktury dokhodov rentnogo 
kharaktera v neftyanom sectore Rossii: uchet interes-
ov syr’evykh regionov [Russian oil rents: interests of 
resource-rich regions] in Neftegazovyi sector Rossii v 
teorii i na praktike [Russian oil and gas sector: theory 
and practice]. Ed. by Kryukov V., Sevastyanova A. – No-
vosibirsk: Institute of Economics. 2003, p. 73–105.
is adjusted according to movements in global oil 
prices.
The creation of a specific production tax for 
hydrocarbons was an indication of government’s 
inability to establish norms and regulations 
which could have helped limit transfer pricing 
opportunities for oil and gas companies.3 
The key advantages of the production tax 
include the simplicity of its operation both in 
terms of methods used for its calculation as well 
as the administrative costs involved. Another 
benefit of the production tax was its efficiency 
in counteracting transfer pricing practices 
previously employed by domestic oil companies. 
For example, the production tax (until 2007) 
applied a uniform rate for all hydrocarbon fields, 
regardless of their specific conditions, whereas 
the previously used royalty took into account 
the geological or economic diversity of different 
fields. 
Under the new framework, 80 % of the 
production tax went to the federal budget, while 
the hydrocarbon producing regions received 20 %. 
Subsequently, the regional share of the production 
tax for oil was reduced to 5 %, while the entire 
tax for gas production was retained by the federal 
budget. In September 2009, the government 
adopted new amendments to the Budgetary Code 
which intends to abolish the regional oil tax share 
starting in 2010 when the federal centre will 
collect the 5 % share currently retained by the 
regions. As a result, the new taxation has further 
lowered incomes for hydrocarbon producing 
provinces.
The production tax immediately became 
the object of harsh criticism as it failed to take 
into account the diverse levels of development 
among hydrocarbon fields, since the degree 
3 Kryukov V., Tokarev A. Investitsionnyi klimat v neft-
egazovom sektore Rossii [Investment climate in Russian 
oil and gas sector]. Novosibirsk: Vestnik NGU. Seriia: 
Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie nauki. 2006. Vol. 6, p. 84–
97.
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of the field depletion determines the level of 
production expenditures. In view of this, in 2007, 
a more flexible and differentiated approach to the 
production tax was introduced which focused 
on: 
• the level of field depletion when estimating 
the production tax. For example, if 
depletion exceeds 80 %, it is possible 
to apply a reduction coefficient when 
calculating the production tax. “Mature” 
oil and gas producing regions, such as 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, benefited 
especially from these new rules;
• the use of a zero tax rate for Eastern 
Siberian oil fields (applicable until 
production reach 25 million tonnes in 
certain fields).
In addition to the production tax, export 
duties on hydrocarbons also play an important 
role in generating revenues for the federal budget. 
In 2002, Russian oil export duties began to be 
determined by a flexible scale system based on 
global oil prices.1 Although, this new approach 
significantly increased the tax burden for oil 
companies, it established clearer and more 
predictable rules for investors. If in the past the 
system of rates was regulated by governmental 
decrees, the new clearly defined system of export 
duties is based on a federal law. This new formula 
for collecting export duties is also more flexible 
in nature, helping to avoid drastic fluctuations 
which tended to occur under the pre-2001 gradual 
scale system.
In the current context, the tax burden levied 
on oil companies has become considerably 
high. This leads to lower geological exploration 
activities, slow development of new oil and gas 
areas, and an increase in the number of abandoned 
wells in mature fields. For example, when oil 
prices soared above USD 60 per barrel the 
1 The tax was not levied if prices fell below $109.5 per 
tonne. 
government used the taxation system to collect 
more than 80 % of companies’ additional revenues 
(Fig. 2). At the same time, oil companies faced a 
significant increase in oil extraction expenditures. 
For instance, 2006–2007 witnessed a near 50 % 
rise in pipeline costs for the hydrocarbon sector. 
During this period, domestic oil companies also 
experienced rising costs due to the strengthening 
of the rouble in relation to the US dollar (used in 
Russian export contracts). 
Since 2007 the government has been more 
responsive and efficient to changes in the oil 
industry taxation. For instance, it initiated a 
number of changes in the taxation system aimed 
at resolving specific problems, such as the 
reduction of the tax burden, stimulation of oil 
development in new areas, and the modification 
of the preferential tax regime for developed “old” 
fields (Table 2).
Another important challenge facing the 
hydrocarbon sector is improvement of the taxation 
system for the gas industry.2 At the moment, there 
is a uniform production tax in place for all fields 
regardless of field depletion (maturity), absence 
of mechanisms to stimulate the development of 
new gas areas, as well as a lack of any correlation 
between gas prices in external markets and gas 
export duties.
Overall, production tax and export duties 
currently remain the principal mechanisms 
for collection of rents in the oil and gas sector 
(Fig. 3).
3. To spend or to save?  
Issues confronting resource rents  
and special funds
Special financial funds (known as sovereign 
wealth funds or reserve funds) seek to facilitate 
2 Kryukov V., Silkin V., Shmat V., Tokarev A. Podkhody 
k differentsiatsii nalogooblozheniia v gazovoi promysh-
lennosti [Flexible taxation in gas sector]. – Novosibirsk: 
Institute of Economics. 2006. – 169 p.
Table 2. Tax policy in the Russian oil and gas sector 
Taxation problems within  
the oil and gas sector Solutions
High tax burden levels for oil 
production
Modifications to the production tax formula, resulting in lower tax 
levels
Inadequate taxation system for the 
development of new oil areas
Introduction of a preferential tax regime (tax benefits) for oil production 
in specific new areas
Lack of a preferential tax regime 
(tax benefits) for mature fields 
Changes to the way hydrocarbon production is valued during mature 
stages of field development
Lack of flexible taxation for the gas 
sector
Discussions continue with no real decisions reached as of yet
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sustainable socio-economic development of 
resource-rich countries, by:
• promoting the accumulation of resource 
rents, which would otherwise be spent;
• prolonging the impact of lucrative 
resource-rich periods on the domestic 
economy and society for many generations 
to come;
• providing an additional source of income 
for the country and its regions;
• stimulating the diversification of the 
economy.1
At the regional level, special financial funds 
are primarily intended to ensure the sustainable 
development as hydrocarbon fields reach their 
production peak and maturity. At the national 
level, these funds also function as stabilising 
mechanisms, ensuring the maintenance of a 
reasonable exchange rate, especially during 
periods of high oil prices. In this sense, the 
Russian Stabilisation Fund was designed in 2004 
along the same principles utilised in Norway and 
Chile, where special financial funds have played, 
and continue to play, such an important role.
In the Russian case, the level of investment 
functions of special funds is often seen as being 
linked to the level of inflation. However, direct 
investment into industrial fixed assets does 
not make a negative impact on inflation or the 
exchange balance. In fact, new real investments 
create new industrial assets, which promote 
reduced inflation levels (due to the growth of 
commodities relative to financial resources). 
1 Kryukov V., Sevastyanova A., Shmat V. Utopicheskaya 
ideya ili real’naya nadezhda? Otsenka vozmozhnos-
tei sozdaniya i deyatel’nosti spetsial’nykh finansovykh 
fondov syr’evykh territorii v Rossii i analiz zarubezh-
nogo opyta [Special financial funds in resource-rich re-
gions]. – Novosibirsk: Assotsiatsiya Banki Sibiri, 1996. 
Warrack A., Keddie R. Alberta Heritage Funds vs Alaska 
Permanent Fund: A Comparative Analysis. – Faculty of 
Business, University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1999. – 19 
p. Fasano U. Review of the Experience with Oil Stabili-
zation and Savings Funds in Selected Countries. – Inter-
national Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper, 2000. No. 
12. – 20 p.
These considerations led to the formation of the 
Russian Investment Fund which aimed to boost 
Russia’s economic development by promoting 
new investment projects. Practical realisation of 
such projects through these special funds requires 
not only an adequate economic and industrial 
base, but also a developed civil society, political 
accountability and transparency of financial 
institutions.
3.1. Special financial funds in the 1990s: 
discussions at the federal level,  
real steps at the regional level
The development of natural resources has 
been widely perceived in modern Russian history 
as both a solution to pressing socio-economic 
problems, as well as a source for the formation of 
a modern economy that would ensure the stable, 
long-term development of the country. Russia is 
a resource-rich economy primarily based upon 
the extraction, primary processing and sales 
of natural resources. Hence, Russia’s economy 
faces problems similar to those of other resource-
rich countries. Russia’s biggest challenge is 
to transform its economy in order to make it 
less dependent on the raw materials sector. 
The successful development of high-tech and 
innovative (value-added) products and services 
could address these issues. A portion of rents 
from the extraction of raw materials can serve 
as a financial base for the diversification of the 
economy: discussions in Russia have focused on 
different ideas and approaches towards achieving 
such an “appropriate” utilisation of resource 
rents. Since the collapse of the USSR, the main 
discussions have revolved around the following 
topics:
• Should the rents from raw materials 
development be saved or spent?
• What role should the federal centre and 
the resource-rich regions play in the 
utilisation of resource rents?
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• Should the resource rents go towards 
addressing urgent social issues or towards 
the modernization and diversification of 
the economy?
• What kind of legal frameworks and 
mechanisms should guide the use of 
funds drawn from resource rents?
There have been several approaches toward 
the accumulation and utilisation of resource rents in 
Russia, namely the formation of the Development 
Budget and special funds at the federal level and 
the creation of regional-based development funds 
(such as the Future Generations funds).
The economic development of oil and 
gas producing regions is traditionally 
linked with key stages in the development of 
the local oil and gas sector. For instance, a 
newly discovered oil field and its subsequent 
development is likely to lead to intensive 
economic activity, including an inf lux of 
labour, rapid development of the relevant 
infrastructure, and an emergence of new 
settlements for oil workers and personnel 
involved in support services. Conversely, 
with field depletion or unfavourable economic 
circumstances in external markets (such as 
low oil prices), there is bound to be a reduction 
in traditional economic activity. This leads 
to a number of socio-economic problems, 
such as growing unemployment and the lack 
of financial resources for the maintenance 
of vital local infrastructure. Therefore, the 
biggest challenge for oil and gas producing 
territories is how to establish and maintain 
stable conditions for their long-term socio-
economic development.1
After the collapse of the USSR and during 
the subsequent economic transition in Russia, 
there were widespread attempts to form various 
1 Kryukov V. Strategiia ustoichivogo razvitiia [Strategy 
of sustainable development for resource-rich regions]. – 
Neftegazovaya vertikal’. No. 3. 2001. p. 92–95.
development funds aimed at solving economic 
problems and facilitating economic and social 
stability specifically in resource-rich regions.
In the 1990s, the federal government 
did not have adequate financial resources 
to address vital socio-economic problems 
within the Russian regions, including the 
adequate maintenance of the social safety net, 
the healthcare and pension systems and the 
vital regional infrastructure. As a result, the 
federal centre granted regional administrations 
considerable rights and responsibilities in 
relation to natural resource management and 
the formation of their own financial funds by 
using a portion of the royalty. Thus, Moscow 
allowed regions to form institutions which 
would facilitate the creation of conditions 
conducive to the stable, long-term socio-
economic development of the periphery.2
For example, the KMAO Future Generations 
Fund was established in accordance with the 
local law on generation funds, in December 1994. 
It was aimed to diversify the region’s economy 
and to create supplementary budgetary sources 
while hydrocarbons depleted. Until 2001, 15 % 
of regional royalties were transferred to the fund. 
From 2002, the KMAO Future Generations Fund 
received up to 15 % of the regional budget’s 
share of the mineral production tax. In 1990s and 
2000s around 15 % of regional rents (royalties 
and production tax) was saving in main oil-rich 
regions.
The KMAO fund illustrates a balanced 
and well thought-out approach to solving future 
problems of resource-rich territories. The money 
is being invested not only into financial and fixed 
assets, but also into the development of human 
potential.3
2 Kryukov V. Zhadnost’ “bogov”: komu idut na pol’zu 
“fondy razvitiia” – obshestvu ili otdel’nym grazhdanam? 
[Problems of special oil fund use]. – EKO. No. 9. 2001, p. 
23–51.
3 http://www.fphmao.ru. 2009.
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Today, the fund allocates money for 
investment:
• in commercially efficient enterprises in 
the agro-industrial complex;
• into the creation of infrastructure for the 
forestry and wood-processing industries;
• into the creation of a social infrastructure, 
including a Winter Sports Centre, a 
children’s physical education school, 
a state library and art gallery, and a 
community centre “Gostinny Dvor”;
• in shareholdings of enterprises and 
banks;
• in property.
The Future Generations Fund aims to 
provide a material base for the region’s socio-
economic development. The Fund’s assets 
comprise renewable fixed and financial resources, 
which supplement, and will eventually replace, 
tax payments from the production of oil and 
gas. The implementation of this approach should 
eliminate KMAO’s one-sided dependency on oil 
development and should create guarantees for the 
provision of a high level of living standards and 
employment.
3.2. Special funds in the 2000s:  
changes at the federal level
In 2000–2003, the Russian government 
planned federal budgetary expenditures based on 
budget revenues generated under an oil price level 
of $20 per barrel. Although additional revenues 
accumulated during higher oil prices (of more than 
$20 per barrel) were utilised to pay off Russia’s 
external debt, no special financial institution (such 
as a stabilisation fund) was established for this 
purpose. Since 2000, the federal government has 
primarily used oil and gas revenues to ensure the 
stability of its fiscal system. From 2000 to 2003, 
the Russian government focused on restoring 
macroeconomic stability, solving sovereign debt 
issues, and protecting the budget and the entire 
economy from external price fluctuations. The 
ensuing fiscal policies proved relatively effective 
and prevented the economy from operating under 
a deficit.
Starting in 2004, the Russian government 
declared a transition to an “active fiscal policy”, 
directed at the creation of favourable conditions 
for economic development, resolution of the most 
urgent social problems, and improvement in the 
efficiency of the public sector. As part of the tax 
reform measures addressed by these policies, 
rents from the production of mineral resources 
increased and were allocated to the federal 
budget, while the tax burden for other sectors of 
the economy was reduced.
Currently, one of the most contentious 
debates in Russian economic policy concerns the 
problems and implementation issues associated 
with the use of oil and gas government revenues. 
The Russian Ministry of Finance has taken 
a resilient stance on the necessity of creating 
state special funds. Its experts are aware of 
the fundamental issues, such as the “the Dutch 
Disease”.
Opponents to the concept of Russian special 
funds, those who are opposed to the application 
of these funds by the Ministry of Finance, posit 
the following concerns:1
• funds allocated from budget revenues, 
which are then invested into foreign 
stocks, can be considered a removal 
of resource rents from the country, 
thus benefiting foreign interests. As a 
result, the refinancing of the national 
economy is carried through foreign 
entities which receive Russian funds 
at nearly no cost. At the same time, 
these financial resources are later 
reintroduced through the private sector 
1 Voronin Yu. Neneftegazovyi budzhet: dovody i kontrdo-
vody [Non-oil budget: pro and contra]. – Ekonomist. No. 
8. 2007, p. 62–69.
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in the form of foreign bank loans, at 
higher interest rates;
• by collecting oil and gas revenues, the 
government impedes inter-sectoral capital 
flows and can hinder domestic economic 
activity, especially in the oil and gas 
sector;
• by contrast, investing oil and gas 
revenues into the national economy could 
benefit several issues, such as incurring 
high returns on currently “frozen” 
governmental reserves, modernising 
the economy through the development 
of high-technology sectors, helping to 
resolve issues regarding GDP growth, 
boosting living standards, and lowering 
inflation.
However, according to the Russian Ministry 
of Finance, fiscal stability is most susceptible 
to a high budgetary dependence on oil and gas 
revenues. For instance, of particular concern 
are structural shifts due to the relatively slow 
growth of the oil and gas sector which, along 
with an increase in the real exchange rate of the 
rouble, have led to a decrease in the market share 
of this economic sector. In particular, when the 
tax burden for this sector considerably exceeds 
the tax burden in other sectors, a significant 
decrease in budgetary incomes could result. This 
can be exacerbated by any price fluctuations for 
hydrocarbons, since it would directly influence 
income from the oil and gas sector.
Therefore, the main features introduced by 
the federal government to improve the utilisation 
of rents (government resource revenue) are:
• the accumulation of all rents into the 
federal budget;
• an emphasis on stabilizing the financial 
system, at the expense of infrastructure 
and production expenditures;
• establishment of simple and transparent 
institutional arrangements to handle oil 
and gas revenues and improve resource 
management.
Nevertheless, during this period the deci-
sion-making process becomes bureaucratic with-
out any participation of regional authorities and 
NGOs. 
The significant exposure of the Russian 
economy and financial system to price fluctua-
tions in the global oil markets was the core rea-
son behind the formation of the Stabilisation 
Fund. The Stabilisation Fund was established in 
2004, in accordance with the new Budget Code, 
with the intention of allocating revenues from 
hydrocarbon export duties and mineral resource 
production taxes into the Fund. The Stabilisation 
Fund was designed to accumulate revenues from 
oil prices that exceeded the cut-off price set at $20 
per barrel (increased to $27 per barrel in 2006) 
in order to balance the federal budget should oil 
prices fall below the cut-off level. In 2004–2007 
the Russian government used the Stabilisation 
Fund to accumulate any additional hydrocarbon 
revenues. The Stabilisation Fund secured around 
¾ of additional revenues due to high oil prices 
in external markets. The Fund’s resources were 
then invested into foreign assets, converted into 
foreign currency or deposited into foreign banks.
Therefore, the Stabilisation Fund was creat-
ed to protect the national economy from negative 
consequences in the case of falling oil prices and 
to provide stabilisation to the national currency 
in times of higher prices. The Stabilisation Fund 
also played an important role as a mechanism to 
prevent inflation surges and to ensure currency 
stabilisation during periods of trade surplus. By 
early 2008, the Russian national debt dropped to 
7 % of its GDP due to a severe restriction on do-
mestic borrowing, with almost a complete halt on 
external borrowing (in combination with preterm 
repayment of a considerable part of the national 
debt using Stabilisation Fund resources). In ef-
fect, the Russian national debt, as a percentage 
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of its GDP, became lower than its counterparts in 
other developed and transitional countries.
In January 2008, the Ministry of Finance 
split the Stabilisation Fund into the Reserve Fund 
and the National Welfare Fund. The foreign cur-
rency reserves of each fund are denominated in 
US dollars (45 %), Euros (45 %) and GB pounds 
(10 %). As of 2008, oil and gas government rev-
enues have been calculated separately from other 
federal budget revenues based upon: the produc-
tion tax for oil and gas resources; export duties on 
oil, natural gas and petroleum products.
A portion of oil and gas revenues defined as 
an “oil and gas transfers” are used annually to 
finance federal budget expenditures. The volume 
of the oil and gas transfers is outlined in the law 
“On the Federal Budget” for each upcoming fiscal 
year and planning period (Fig. 4).
The proportion of “oil and gas transfers” 
are determined according to the percentage of 
the predicted GDP amount for the year: 6.1 % in 
2008; 5.5 % in 2009; 4.5 % in 2010; and 3.7 % in 
2011. Once the amount of the oil and gas transfers 
is determined, the remainder of the hydrocarbon 
revenues is channelled into the Reserve Fund. 
The size of the Reserve Fund is defined by the 
“Law on the Federal Budget” as a 10 % share 
of the predicted annual GDP. After the set limit 
for the Reserve Fund is reached, the remainder 
of the hydrocarbon revenues is collected into the 
National Welfare Fund (NWF).1
Revenues garnered from hydrocarbon 
development (in framework of state budget) 
are used for different purposes, such as the 
implementation of high-priority national 
projects and Federal Target Programmes, as 
well as contributing to the Russian Investment 
Fund. However, oil and gas revenues were only 
accumulated into the Stabilisation Fund (until 
January 2008), and subsequently (from February 
2008) shared between the Reserve Fund and the 
National Welfare Fund.
The Reserve Fund serves as one of the 
financial sources for the federal budget. Created 
to provide stability in case of reduced oil and 
gas revenues, the Reserve Fund helps decrease 
1 Russian Ministry of Finance. Official Website: www.
minfin.ru. 2009.
Oil and gas revenue of federal level (budget + funds):
production tax and export duty (~90%)
“Oil and gas 
transfers” for federal 
budget (~40%)
Reserve
Fund
(~20%) 
National 
Wealth Fund
(~30%)
Revenues of 
oil and gas
regions,
Profit tax
(~10%)
Revenues from oil-and-gas companies (100%)
GDP
Fig. 4. Oil and gas government revenues and special funds
Note. Estimated on the basis of Russian Ministry of Finance data for 2008.
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inflationary pressures and a national economic 
dependency on potentially volatile hydrocarbon 
export revenues. Thus, the Reserve Fund serves 
as an integral source and pillar of the federal 
budget. 
The Russian government establishes the 
limits for authorised financial assets in the total 
volume of invested financial resources of the 
Reserve Fund. As mentioned earlier, Reserve 
Fund resources were intended to finance the oil 
and gas transfer and the preterm repayment of 
the external national debt. It was also designed to 
finance the oil and gas transfer should oil and gas 
revenues from the federal budget come short in a 
given financial year. Such utilisation of Reserve 
Fund resources would allow for the maintenance 
of a balanced budgetary policy during years 
when global prices for energy resources might 
be low, thereby reducing the budget’s exposure to 
fluctuations in energy market prices.
The Reserve Fund is also utilized to make 
preterm repayments of the external national debt, 
hence reducing the federal budget tax burden 
which may result from unplanned federal budget 
revenues, and also helping preserve federal budget 
resources by reducing debt service expenditures. 
The National Welfare Fund (NWF), along 
with the Reserve Fund, was created from the 
split of the Stabilisation Fund. It was designed 
primarily as a stabilising mechanism for the long-
term provision of pensions for Russian citizens. 
The Fund’s main aims were: (1) to contribute to 
the voluntary pension savings of Russian citizens, 
and (2) to help balance the budget and resolve the 
deficit of the Russian Pension Fund.
The NWF is managed similarly to the 
Reserve Fund, with the long-term aim of ensuring 
security of the Fund’s financial resources and 
maintaining a stable level of revenues from 
investments. The Russian government has also 
established that NWF funds can be invested 
into the same financial assets as those of the 
Reserve Fund. According to the Russian Budget 
Code, NWF resources can be converted into 
foreign currency or invested into financial assets 
denominated in foreign currencies, similar to 
the Reserve Fund.
3.3. Oil and gas revenues  
and state investment: how efficient  
are they from a public perspective?
As oil and gas revenues accumulate within 
the federal budget, in the form of an oil and 
gas transfers, they are used for other projects 
including the implementation of Federal Target 
Programmes, high-priority national projects, 
and the accumulation of funds into the Russian 
Investment Fund.
Improvement of the living standards of 
Russian citizens has become one of the main 
priorities of Russia’s national policy. Russia’s 
improved economic circumstances allowed it to 
more tangibly enhance general standards of living 
whilst maintaining microeconomic stability and 
suppressing inflation. The improved economic 
conditions thus created an environment conducive 
to the implementation of high-priority national 
projects focusing on healthcare, education, 
agriculture and housing. Such sectors determine 
the quality of life and social development, and 
are thus integral to the concept of “human capital 
development”.1 Therefore, the implementation 
of national projects is in many ways related to 
human capital investment.
And yet, from 2006–2008, direct investment 
into these “human capital development” areas 
(not accounting for the federal budget social 
expenditures in other sectors) comprised only 
6–9 % of the federal budget’s share of oil and 
gas revenues (Table 3). In 2008, when financing 
for national projects exceed RUR 330 billon, this 
figure amounted to 6.7 %.
1 Prioritetnye natsional’nye proekty [High-priority na-
tional projects]. Official website: www.rost.ru.
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The sufficiency of this amount for “human 
capital development” is debatable, particularly 
considering the current lack of development 
within these areas (such as healthcare and 
housing) compared to world standards.
The Russian Investment Fund and Federal 
Target Programmes have become vitally important 
for the enactment of Russia’s investment policies. 
The Federal Target Programmes are intended 
to help alleviate the most pressing socio-
economic problems of the Russian economy, such 
as regional development and the development 
of various branches of the Russian economy 
in general. According to the Russian Ministry 
for Economic Development, 46 Federal Target 
Programmes and 36 auxiliary programmes are 
currently being implemented.
The Investment Fund’s primary purpose is 
to provide governmental support for investment 
projects of the federal significance. This can take 
the form of:
• co-financing based on specific investment 
project requirements;
• transfer of funds to authorised corporate 
bodies;
• provision of governmental guarantees for 
investment projects.
As demonstrated by 85 % of the applica-
tions submitted to the Ministry for Economic 
Development requesting governmental support 
from the Investment Fund, co-financing is appar-
ently the most popular option among investment 
project sponsors. This implies that the majority 
of investment projects use state funds to create 
federal infrastructure objects, thus stimulating 
large-scale investment from the private sector.
Since all federal budget natural resource 
payments have been centralised, major oil and 
gas producing regions have now become the re-
cipients of the Investment Fund’s monetary re-
sources whereas, up to 2004, these same regions 
would have been independently financed or self-
financed. For instance, in mid-2008, the Ministry 
for Regional Development allocated RUR 80 bil-
lion for regional investment projects to resource-
rich regions such as Yakutia, Bashkortostan, 
Krasnoyarsk region, and Tatarstan.1
A substantial problem related to the Invest-
ment Fund concerns the substantial length of time 
taken to consider and negotiate the projects – a 
process which normally takes a year to a year and 
a half. This is likely due to an overwhelming con-
centration of decision-making authority within 
the federal government and the relative exclusion 
of regions from this process.
According to the Federal State Statistics 
Service, the portion of budgetary funds within 
the fixed capital formation framework for the per-
iod of 2000–2007 was at a relatively high level 
(around 20 %). In 2007, the share of budgetary 
financing of fixed capital formation comprised 
21.2 %. The share of the federal budget funds in-
1 Shpigel M., Kaz’min D. Raspredilili den’gi [Using of In-
vestment Fund]. Vedomosti. July 21, 2008. 
Table 3. High-priority national projects and oil and gas government revenues (OGR), RUR billion
National Projects 2006 2007
Healthcare 91.2 131.3
Education 29.3 48.9
Affordable housing 33.8 50.9
Agriculture 21.9 25.4
Total 176.2 256.5
Total as share of OGR 6.0 % 8.9 %
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creased within the total volume of investments. 
The increase for this period comprised 2.4 per-
centage points (from 6.0 % in 2000 to 8.4 % in 
2007).
However, the increased governmental efforts 
to promote and sustain economic growth through 
such projects simultaneously made apparent the 
lack of developed and effective institutions. For 
instance, during a June 2008 session of the Rus-
sian government Presidium, it was noted that out 
of RUR 218 billion allocated for high priority na-
tional projects, nearly a fifth – 17.7 % – remained 
unimplemented.1 During an international invest-
ment forum in Sochi, the head of the Ministry 
of Regional Development at that time, Dmitry 
Kozak, acknowledged that the Investment 
Fund and other institutes for development were 
utilising only 10–15 % of their potential. Over-
bureaucratisation of the state apparatus has been 
responsible for such inefficiency, as well as the 
lack of clearly defined procedures for replenish-
ing the Investment Fund. Previously, the size of 
the Investment Fund was directly correlated to 
the volume of the Stabilisation Fund. However, 
following the split of the Stabilisation Fund into 
the Reserve and National Welfare Funds, this link 
disappeared. Currently, there is an agreement 
with the Ministry of Finance that the Fund should 
receive RUR 100 billion on an annual basis.2
3.4. Oil funds in crisis:  
the financial reserves have proven  
to be too small
The 2008–2009 financial crisis has led to 
a new wave of capital flight from Russia. As a 
result, the entire banking system, the financial 
markets, as well as budgetary social payments 
were brought under threat. In October 2008, 
1 Netreba P. Dlya uspekha natsproektov ne nuzhny 
den’gi. – Kommersant. June 10, 2008.
2 Kukol E. Den’gi iz “odnogo okna”. Minregion razrabotal 
novye pravila dlya Investfonda. – Rossiiskaiia gazeta. 
September 24, 2008.
the Russian government decided to change the 
way hydrocarbon revenues were utilised. In 
particular, the government aimed to use the 
resources of the Reserve Fund and the National 
Welfare Future to stabilise Russian financial 
markets, to reduce the budget deficit, and to 
provide financial aid to specific projects. In 
March-April 2009, the government used 1 
trillion roubles from the Reserve Fund to finance 
budgetary expenditures.
At the same time, the government deposited 
the National Welfare Fund reserves (625 billion 
roubles) into the state corporation “Bank for 
Development and Foreign Economic Affairs” 
(Vnesheconombank). These resources were used 
to stabilise the financial markets and were also 
invested into portfolio shares in the sum of 168 
billion roubles. In November-December 2008, 
the Vnesheconombank invested the deposited 
reserves of the National Welfare Bank into 
shares of key Russian corporate entities: LUKoil, 
Rosneft, Gazprom, Russian Savings Bank, 
Norilsk Nickel, and the Bank for Foreign Trade 
(VTB). 
In November 2008 the total reserves of the 
National Welfare Fund were estimated at 1667.48 
billion roubles, reaching 2863.08 billion roubles 
on 1st September 2009 whereas the reserves of 
the Reserve Fund declined from 3572.78 billion 
roubles on 1st November 2008 down to 2238.6 
billion roubles on 1st December 2009.
In 2009 all hydrocarbon revenues, instead of 
being sent to the Reserve Fund and the National 
Welfare Fund, were directly incorporated into 
the budgetary revenues to cover day-to-day 
expenditures of the federal budget.
In recent circumstances (as of 2009), the 
deficit of the Russian Budget is supposed to 
remain at around 6 % of GDP. At the same time 
however, budgetary expenditures are not being 
reduced but, on the contrary, are increasing. The 
government assumes that the reduction of social 
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and investment expenditures could undermine 
the future potential of the Russian economy.
There has not been a drastic decline of 
world oil prices in comparison to the 2003–
2004 period (when the Russian Stabilisation 
Fund was formed). Although external market 
conditions have not changed the domestic 
budgetary situation has changed dramatically: 
instead of a budget surplus, the government now 
has limited financial resources at its disposal. 
The current situation with the Russian budget 
evolved from the 2004–2009 period when the 
government expanded the scope of budgetary 
expenditures. 
It was initially assumed that the Stabilisation 
Fund’s primary objective was to stabilise 
the financial situation in the country: i.e. by 
withdrawing parts of hydrocarbon revenues from 
the domestic market, inflation could be curtailed. 
However, this governmental objective was 
achieved only once (just before the formation of 
the Stabilisation Fund) when inflation remained 
at the planned annual level of 12 %. However, 
before the current crisis period, the government 
failed to keep inflation at bay when it increased to 
over 13 % per annum. 
Capital flight, decline of oil and gas prices, 
and an increase in budgetary expenditures has 
forced the government to change the way the 
Russian Budget was formed. In September 2009 
the Russian State Duma passed amendments to 
the Budget Code, allowing the government to 
increase budgetary expenditures in 2010 and 
up to 2012. The amended legislation promotes 
centralisation of the following payments which 
are allocated into the Federal Budget:
• Revenues from the mineral resource 
production tax (for oil and gas condensate). 
At the moment 5 % of this tax goes to 
the producing regions. This means that 
Tyumen oblast in particular, being the 
main source of Russia’s hydrocarbon 
outputs, will lose a large share of its 
regional budgetary revenues.
• All revenues of the Reserve Fund and the 
National Welfare Fund. This implies that 
such revenues will remain in the Federal 
Budget without being transferred to the 
regional level. 
• Additionally, in 2010–2012, profits 
payable by the Central Bank of Russia 
to the Federal Budget will increase from 
50 % to 75 %.
The decline of Reserve Fund resources 
and growing budgetary expenditures are likely 
to lead to a situation whereby Russia will use 
accumulated hydrocarbon revenues faster than 
previously envisioned. The Reserve Fund could 
be spent almost entirely by 2010.
According to Russian government’s 
estimates in 2010 the Russian budgetary deficit 
will be covered mainly by the Reserve Fund (1.83 
trillion roubles), as well as the National Welfare 
Fund (413.5 billion roubles). In addition, the 
government plans to borrow 429.6 billion roubles 
in external markets and 261.5 billion in internal 
markets. In 2011 the government will continue to 
borrow funds in external markets (514.4 billion 
roubles) and domestically (657.3 billion roubles) 
as well as tap into the the National Welfare Fund 
(762.4 billion roubles). According to official 
estimates, by the end of 2011 the Russian reserve 
fund will contain only 48.8 billion roubles 
whereas the National Welfare Fund will decline 
from 2.81 trillion roubles down to 1.8 trillion 
in 2011 (Fig. 5). At the same time, the Russian 
public debt is projected to increase from 12.7 % 
of GDP in 2010 up to 15.4 % in 2012.
3.5. Economic diversification plans:  
never implemented
During the 1992–2009 period, Russia 
failed to create an effective model of resource 
management – both in terms of exploration and 
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development of oil and gas resources, and in 
terms of adequate use of oil and gas revenues 
for the diversification of the national economy 
in order to curtail its “resource curse” symptoms 
(Fig. 6).
Russia has failed to develop adequate 
methods and procedure for effective accumulation 
of oil and gas revenues for purposes of economic 
diversification. An example of such a failure can 
be illustrated by the government’s decision, in 
2007, to set up state corporations with the intended 
aim of promoting economic diversification. The 
seven established state corporations – including 
Rostechnologia (Russian Technologies), Rosatom 
(Russian Atomic Industries), Olimpstroi (Olympic 
Games Construction), RosNano (Russian Nano 
Technologies) and ZhKKH Development Fund 
(Fund for the Development of Housing Support 
Services) – were granted special rights and 
authorities, similar to those of state bodies, 
while retaining many features and capabilities of 
large commercial entities. The government also 
transferred 2 trillion roubles worth of assets to 
these companies in addition to the 640 billion 
roubles derived from the state budget (which 
constitutes nearly 20 % of the annual budgetary 
expenditures). Due to their official status as 
non-commercial entities, the main agenda of 
these corporations was to deal with specific 
state goals, and not to generate profit. However, 
once state assets and financial resources have 
been transferred under the control of these 
corporations, the state ceased to be their owner. 
Hence, in 2009, questions were raised about the 
legality of such utilisation of state finances.
The influx of oil and gas revenues, associated 
with high oil prices in external markets, was 
used by the government to solve pressing social 
problems mainly by increasing levels of pension 
payments and basic salaries. In 2000–2006, the 
per capita income of Russian citizens increased 
four-fold from $80 to $370, whereas the 
standard pension level tripled from $25 to $90. 
Astoundingly, over the past eight years, gross 
revenues of oil companies surpassed $1 trillion, 
whereas their net income reached $150 billion, of 
which $50–$70 billion were invested. During this 
period the state received over $700 billion in oil 
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and gas taxes and duties. However, these large oil 
and gas revenues did not increase the workforce 
in the Russian economy: if in 2006 the Russian 
workforce was estimated at 51 million, by 2008 
this figure fell to 48 million.
In the 2000s the dependence of the Russian 
economy and the society on the domestic oil 
and gas sector increased dramatically. This 
could explain why, in the second half of 2008 
through the first half of 2009, Russia surprisingly 
showed the biggest decline in GDP and industrial 
production among all the countries of the former 
Soviet Union. 
In future situation could be very complex, 
because:
• absence of an effective model of oil and 
gas resource management coupled with 
increasingly challenging conditions 
for the exploration and development of 
new fields located in difficult-to-reach 
territories with severe climates and 
complex geology;
• lack of incentives for private investors 
(both foreign and domestic) to develop new 
fields under the existing legal framework, 
in a sector dominated by state-controlled 
companies (which determine whether a 
given independent company gains access 
to vital infrastructure and key export 
routes);
• the substantial tax burden recently 
imposed on the oil and gas sector, 
coupled with the dominance of state-
controlled oil and gas companies, 
impedes the facilitation of exploration 
and development of new oil and gas 
fields. Various tax exemptions and 
privileges granted by the government 
in 2008-2009 to companies operating in 
new fields could not compensate for the 
high expenditures incurred during their 
industrial development;
• the growing economic dependence upon 
the resource sector over the past eight 
years with a very limited role for the hi-
tech and other modern industrial sectors 
in facilitating economic growth and 
budgetary revenues;
Fig. 6. Structure of value added ( %)
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• successful transformation of the Russian 
economy from resource dependent into 
hi-tech and innovative will depend on a 
successful promotion of incentives for 
investors and greater opportunities for 
entrepreneurs, not only in the oil and 
gas sector but also in other sectors of 
the economy. In the 2000s, the growing 
tax burden forced Russian companies to 
compensate their diminishing revenues 
by borrowing in external markets. This 
resulted in an accelerated economic 
decline in Russia during the crisis 
period.
But the Ministry of Economy predicts a 
substantial increase in the share of innovation 
sector by 2020 (Fig. 7).
Conclusion
The evolution of the Russian resource 
management system reveals a complex picture 
in terms of already adopted decisions and future 
strategies in relation to resource development 
and revenue utilisation. At the same time, it is 
essential to take into account the overall socio-
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Fig. 7. Structure of value added by major sectors of the economy (in 2007 prices)
Source: Concept of long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation until 2020.
economic and political problems of the post-
Soviet transition in Russia when assessing the 
factors behind certain key decisions which have 
shaped the development of the oil and gas sector.
1) During the 1990s, the post-Soviet 
centre-periphery bargaining game in Russia 
and ambiguous legal reforms pertaining to 
subsoil utilisation resulted in a spontaneous 
system guiding field usage at the regional and 
local (municipal) levels. The weakness of the 
federal government in light of mounting socio-
economic problems in the resource-rich regions 
resulted in provincial administrations expanding 
their authority over subsoil use and actively 
seeking to resolve the problems associated with 
the exploration and production of hydrocarbons 
within their domains. 
At the same time, during this period, the 
decision-making system was mostly democratic 
with a well functioning “two-keys” approach, 
whereby regions took a very active role in 
resource management. The involvement of NGOs 
(such as local associations of indigenous peoples) 
in the decision-making processes at the regional 
level was a very positive trend of the resource 
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management system which existed in Russia in 
the 1990s. Unfortunately, this period was also 
characterised by a tendency to view the resource 
licensing process primarily as an ultimate 
solution to pressing socio-economic problems of 
resource-rich regions. 
2) In the 2000s, a new trend developed in 
Russia whereby the federal centre concentrated 
most of the authority over mineral resource 
management into its hands. As a result, the role 
of the bureaucratic administration over issues of 
subsoil use increased at the expense of regions 
and NGOs. 
This reduced regional and societal role 
in resource management has led to a situation 
whereby oil and gas companies no longer see it as 
their priority to promote stable socio-economic 
development of the specific resource-rich regions 
within which they operate. Hence, active regional 
participation in the resource management 
is an important precondition for sustainable 
development since:
• environmental and social benefits and 
costs are primarily felt at the regional 
level;
• unlike the federal centre, regional 
administrations and NGOs are closer 
to the actual locations of hydrocarbon 
production and, therefore, could be more 
effective in adopting more appropriate 
administrative mechanisms;
• the impact of the oil and gas sector on the 
Russian society is increasing especially 
in regions with mature and depleting 
hydrocarbon fields;
• effective monitoring and oversight of 
subsoil development by the federal centre 
is difficult to manage without active 
regional participation, due to the large 
areas to be monitored. 
3) Starting in 2001, the government began 
using revenues from the development of mineral 
resources to stabilise the budget. The following 
steps were thus taken:
• all oil and gas revenues were accumulated 
into the federal budget and special funds;
• emphasis was placed on the stability of 
the financial system, at the expense of 
implementing new infrastructure and re-
investment projects; 
• focus was placed on designing simple 
and transparent procedures for mineral 
resources management, as well as 
resource revenues;
• strengthening of the federal bureaucratic 
administration at the expense of the 
regions, NGOs, in addressing all 
abovementioned issues.
4) During the 1992–2009 period, Russia 
failed to create an effective model of hydrocarbon 
resource management – both in terms of 
exploration and development of oil and gas 
resources, and in terms of adequate use of oil and 
gas revenues for the diversification of the national 
economy in order to curtail its “resource curse” 
symptoms.
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Эволюция системы управления  
нефтяными ресурсами в России
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Россия 630090, Новосибирск, ул. им. ак. Лаврентьева, 17
Нефтегазовый сектор традиционно играл очень важную роль не только для минерально-
сырьевого комплекса России, но и для местной экономики. В настоящий момент углеводородный 
сектор дает более 60 % российского экспортного дохода и наполняет до 45 % федерального 
бюджета. В результате данный сектор стал движущей силой экономического развития 
страны в целом и, в особенности, — нефте- и газопроизводящих регионов. 
Эволюция системы управления нефтяными ресурсами России демонстрирует сложную 
картину уже действующих решений и будущих стратегий разработки ресурсов и использования 
доходов сектора. В течение 1992—2009 гг. России не удалось создать эффектвную модель 
управления ресурсами углеводородного сектора как с точки зрения разведки и разработки 
нефтяных и газовых ресурсов, но и в смысле адекватного использования нефтяных и газовых 
доходов для диверсификации национальной экономики.
Ключевые слова: нефть, управление ресурсами, налогообложение, специальные фонды.
